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 Foreword
The Cold War ended with an unintended consequence: 
East–West tensions eased but instability and conflict 
exploded in other parts of the world – especially in 
Africa – where Cold War proxies were abandoned to 
their fates. Detente, however, made it possible for the 
international community to respond to these conflicts 
in a more comprehensive, intrusive and less ideological 
manner than was the case in the days of the Cold War. 
Wars within states were no longer off limits. 
The international policy response to the upsurge 
in violent conflict found its apotheosis in the 
development–security nexus. This policy emphasised an 
integrated approach to conflict prevention and 
resolution, based on an apparent correlation between 
violent conflict and low levels of development. Or, as 
Kofi Annan put it: ‘there can be no long-term security 
without development; there can be no long-term 
development without security; and no society can long 
remain prosperous without respect for human rights 
and the rule of law’ (Annan 2012). 
That perspective reshaped development 
cooperation programmes over the last decade. 
Policymakers and practitioners – within and outside 
the UN – began advocating and funding a broad set 
of interventions targeting both the causes and 
consequences of violent conflict, including human 
rights violations, inequality, discrimination, 
marginalisation and exclusion. Aid agencies from major 
OECD donors increasingly focused their resources 
on the reform of national institutions, particularly 
those with a direct impact on the rights, safety, 
security and wellbeing of the individual – the political 
structures, the judiciary and the security services. 
As the head of several UN peacekeeping missions, 
I was both a witness and a participant in the reshaping 
of the development–security agenda. In Sierra Leone, 
for example, the UK launched an ambitious reform 
effort for the national army and police using 
development funding; in Liberia the US was willing to 
do the same. The UN itself, through its peacekeeping, 
development and human rights departments and 
agencies, supported this multidimensional path to 
conflict prevention, made possible by the more 
consensual approach to conflict resolution that 
developed in the Security Council following the end of 
the Cold War. 
So what has been the impact of these changes in 
policy and practice? 
The authors of this paper look at the outcome of 
this ‘New Deal’. They ask rightly, have these changes 
helped to stabilise countries experiencing violent 
conflict? How has development–security integration 
worked out in practice? Are development and security 
mutually reinforcing? They question the assumption 
that there is linear link between development and 
security, ineluctably leading to more stable and 
peaceful states. And they wonder if the prevailing, 
largely Western-led, development–security paradigm 
is one that new and emerging donors will seek 
to emulate. 
In conclusion, they suggest 
a new approach, one that 
recognises the limitations of 
donor understanding and 
influence in complex 
situations of conflict. They 
argue in favour of the 
concepts of entrustment and 
brokerage, which should be 
locally defined and managed 
and deployed alongside the 
current donor approaches. 
This paper is an important 
and timely contribution to 
the debate on how best the international community 
can assist countries afflicted by conflict because, as the 
paper suggests, ‘the key question for development 
partners is not whether development and security 
should be linked but how and for whose benefit’.
Alan Claude Doss, CMG.
Former Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) of the United Nations, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and Head of the UN peacekeeping mission 
(MONUC), with the rank of Under Secretary General 
(2007–2010).
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 executive summary
Development policy and practice in fragile and conflict-affected areas needs to be rethought. 
A growing proportion of aid budgets is going to fragile and conflict-affected states and conflict 
prevention is becoming an important focus of aid spend even in countries that are not affected 
by widespread violence. thus, there is a rationale for development and security being increasingly 
brought together. the issue is how to do this most effectively to promote the security of the 
poor. While development in violent environments is very different from development in stable 
and peaceful areas, the same is true for security. one of the key differences is the fragmentation 
of power and authority which makes it more difficult for outsiders to operate. Development 
stakeholders need to invest more in understanding local realities, politics and power. this report 
proposes a ‘new deal’ based on concepts of entrustment and brokerage to help them do so. 
introduction
With an increasing volume of official development aid 
directed toward fragile and conflict-affected states, the 
question is not whether development and security 
should be linked but rather how and for whose benefit. 
Improvements in governance and security do not 
emanate from a central state that attains a monopoly 
on violence but rather from a constellation of non-state 
actors who form hybrid political orders, sometimes in 
partnership with formal state actors and governance 
structures. The spaces for development in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas are qualitatively different from 
contexts that might be considered to be peaceful and 
stable and, hence, discrete models and approaches are 
needed to work effectively in these. for development 
actors the challenge is how to work in situations where 
authority and power are fragmented and influence is 
abridged by the existence of multiple actors who seek 
to mediate the exercise of domination. However, limits 
of knowledge, capacity and influence to operate 
effectively in fragile and conflict-affected settings is a 
major impediment to crafting development–security 
responses that more effectively address the forms of 
violence and insecurity that undermine development 
and wellbeing for people living in these areas.
In light of rapid shifts in the broader political contexts 
and conditions of fragile and conflict-affected 
situations, this report seeks to provide practical insights 
for development actors cut from a more traditional 
 A man works 
to put a new 
roof on a 
house destroyed 
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civil war in 
Sierra leone.
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cloth – including OECD bilateral donors and 
developmentalist non-governmental organisations – 
on the nature of these changes as well as to suggest 
ways to effectively engage in contexts characterised 
by greater uncertainty, fluidity and multi-polarity. 
 
Changing politics
Developmentalist thinking has often emphasised the 
need to delineate and clearly separate the field of 
activities and actors associated with ‘development’ and 
‘security’. yet, development and security are often 
closely integrated in the stated needs of civilian 
populations in fragile and conflict-affected contexts; 
the actions and political positions of non-state actors; 
the priorities of aid-recipient governments; and aid 
approaches of newly important non-OECD donors 
such as China, India and Turkey. 
Non-state actors such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and mungiki in Kenya have 
claimed the development mantle, seeking to provide 
services and social assistance that are often the preserve 
of ‘traditional’ development agents such as non-
governmental organisations, community organisations 
and religious authorities, and, indeed, of states. 
The New Deal endorsed by the g7+ grouping of 
fragile and conflict-affected states at the busan High 
Level forum on Aid Effectiveness in November 2011 
was the latest example of how aid recipient 
governments are increasingly vocal about setting their 
own priorities for aid and development, which often 
closely overlap with actions to strengthen security and 
political stability. 
The confluence of development with security is also 
readily apparent in the aid approaches of non-OECD 
donors including China and Turkey, whose assistance 
including subsidised loans, technical support and 
preferential trade status maps closely onto their 
commercial, security and political interests.
What also complicates developmentalist efforts to 
separate development from security is that physical 
safety and security in everyday life are top priorities for 
civilian populations in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings. Thus, development that responds to local 
needs in these places often requires supporting 
measures that reduce the impacts of conflict and 
political instability on the poor.
toward more effective development 
– security integration
A different approach is needed to overcome these 
challenges and one that calls for more critical 
engagement and leadership by development actors. 
This necessitates a ‘new deal’ that not only reflects the 
policy interests and priorities of fragile and conflict-
affected country governments but also places 
relationships with local providers of security and 
basic services at the centre of new policy analysis 
and approaches. 
One of the primary objectives of development–
security integration is to address the dynamics of 
insecurity in certain areas, which are by nature quite 
localised. The need to understand the dynamics and 
effects of development–security integration at the local 
level is essential but often overlooked. Development 
and security actors from OECD countries need to find 
ways to respond effectively to local security dynamics 
even though their influence in these settings may 
be attenuated. 
Two alternative concepts – entrustment and brokerage 
– can be used to shape development–security responses 
in these environments alongside other existing 
approaches. Entrustment involves transferring to local 
actors the powers to make decisions, define and assess 
problems, and the resources to act on this. brokerage 
involves actions to build a shared understanding 
amongst actors whose interests may vary significantly 
and whose capacities to act in support of these interests 
may be unequal. facilitating negotiations, trust-building 
and supporting conditions for dialogue to continue are 
all roles that local development partners can fulfil, 
provided the right external support. These also 
contribute to strengthening governance and local 
agreements that improve security and safety. We draw 
on an extensive literature as well as two case studies 
from Kenya and Sierra Leone to show how entrustment 
and brokerage have contributed positively.
Any new deal is about more than the integration of 
security and development. It is about new ways of 
doing development and security, ways that will 
increasingly become mainstreamed as development 
aid focuses increasingly on fragile and conflict-affected 
areas. However, the pressures to spend greater volumes 
of aid, with a larger proportion in more fragile contexts, 
but often with fewer staff, make it difficult for aid 
agencies to practise entrustment and brokerage.
To operate effectively in fragile and conflict-affected 
settings, aid agencies need to (1) commit more staff to 
the field in recognition of the localised nature of the 
issues, (2) recruit staff with complementary skills in 
security, diplomacy, brokering and negotiation, (3) be 
prepared to take more calculated risks, finding ways of 
pooling risk with other actors to minimise political 
fallout at home but not so that accountability is 
weakened, and (4) resist rotation of staff. 
renewing commitments to local partnerships and 
redirecting resources to strengthen these is risky but 
essential to build and sustain innovative responses 
to complex challenges that transcend simple 
categorisation as ‘development problems’, ‘political 
crises’ or ‘security challenges’. Aid agencies have not 
gone overboard in linking development and security. 
They have in fact tinkered at the edges. What is 
needed is a reinvention of development in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas.
1 introduction
few debates in development are as contested as how 
development actors and resources should relate to 
security planning and activity. ‘Development’ and 
‘security’ alike are contested concepts. ‘Development’ 
is notoriously difficult to define precisely – a task that 
has become even more complicated by greater 
mobility, fluidity and multi-polarity as well as the 
shifting distribution of wealth at a global level. 
Security is conflictual and ultimately about 
compromise between competing interests 
(marriage 2012). Understandings of both concepts 
are inseparable from who is speaking and to whom. 
Does the international community – and do different 
actors within this – define ‘development’ and 
‘security’ differently from emerging powers, from 
state elites, from local elites, and those who would 
be considered to be poor and/or vulnerable? 
Discursive shifts between these different levels 
and between actors within these are the essence 
of the development–security debate.
While opinions remain divided over how 
development should be delivered in fragile and 
conflict-affected settings, how closely to work 
with military and security actors, and for what 
ends, there is growing recognition that the 
A woman 
stands in a 
destroyed 
home in the 
village of 
Diahouin, 
Côte d’ivoire.
A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD 76 iNtroDuCtioN
spaces for development have changed and that new 
models and approaches are needed to work effectively 
in these. In practice, development agencies and 
organisations increasingly recognise that development 
programmes that do not take security into account are 
unlikely to succeed and may even create harm for those 
suffering from violence. Judgments regarding the need 
for and effectiveness of development–security 
integration should be made in relation to how these 
address the insecurities experienced by poor and 
vulnerable groups. Enabling safety and security in 
people’s everyday lives and livelihoods is what 
development is fundamentally about in these contexts. 
Far from keeping on the sidelines, development actors 
must be front and centre in discussions on when and 
how to link development with security, for whose 
benefit, with what consequences and for whom.
 While the projection of power and influence as well 
as promotion of trade and security ties have long been 
closely associated with development aid, renewed 
efforts to link development with security in the 
aftermath of the September 11th attacks ushered in a 
new politics of aid resembling those of the Cold War 
(Christian Aid 2004). Since then, tackling fragility and 
strengthening security have become core objectives of 
many bilateral and multilateral development donors. 
Policy coherence and coordination have been promoted 
in order to join up development resources in a larger 
framework to effect lasting change. The latest 
incarnation in development–security thinking in the 
United Kingdom is the Building Stability Overseas Strategy 
(DfID, fCO and moD 2011). The strategy formalises as 
policy an integrated cross-government approach to 
address conflict as signalled in the September 2010 
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSr). 
While many security and military actors recognise 
the need to incorporate aspects of development into 
wider responses to complex situations characterised 
by fragility, conflict and violence, some developmental 
actors – including developmentalist international 
NgOs, mixed mandate relief agencies, human rights 
activists, and sections of civil society in aid-recipient 
contexts – have objected to the closer integration. 
They argue that it infringes on core development 
principles of independence and impartiality and dilutes 
the focus of aid resources that should be allocated 
according to need, not the security and political 
imperatives of external actors. Traditional development 
actors have also questioned the efficacy and 
effectiveness of development–security initiatives, 
arguing that they are poorly conceived and endanger 
development personnel in the course of their work. 
A string of attacks on aid workers, such as the brutal 
killing in 2004 of margaret Hassan, the Irish head of 
CArE in Iraq, fostered a backlash against military-led 
development work, which aid practitioners argued 
had blurred the lines between development action and 
military intervention. Since 2006, the global incidence 
rate of violence against aid workers increased by 61 per 
cent, with Afghanistan, Somalia and Darfur ranking as 
the most dangerous contexts for aid work (ALNAP 
2010). In 2010, 225 aid workers were killed, injured or 
kidnapped in violent attacks, compared to 85 in 2002 
(Oxfam 2011).
Still, most governments have embraced 
development–security integration at strategic 
and programmatic levels. Development–security 
integration has gathered pace through the use of 
pooled funding, alignment of policy strategies across 
different government departments and the military, 
moulding of organisational cultures to promote better 
working relations and coordination across civilian 
governmental departments and security agencies and 
the military, and the piloting of experimental initiatives 
on the ground that use development resources to 
tackle the perceived causes of instability and conflict. 
Across OECD donor countries, there is a wide embrace 
of the whole-of-government approach (Patrick and 
brown 2007; OECD 2006). The fact that an increasing 
proportion of official development assistance is directed 
toward fragile states means that development–security 
integration is becoming commonplace. While shifting 
geo-strategic priorities after 9/11 heightened the 
importance of fragile states in security approaches and 
frameworks, and for some offered a new ideological 
rationale for development aid, attention to the need 
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2 integrating development 
and security in an increasingly 
complex world
to address conflict and violence has been growing 
for some time, as signified by the 2011 World 
Development report. 
Developmentalist critiques of the so-called 
‘securitisation of aid’ are falling behind the curve of 
rapid shifts happening in the political and security 
contexts of fragile and conflict-affected areas.
These raise new challenges for traditional development 
actors including OECD donors and non-governmental 
organisations and sections of civil society in aid-
recipient contexts. first, while the focus of 
development–security integration has been on the 
most fragile contexts such as Afghanistan, Somalia and 
South Sudan, most violence now occurs outside classic 
conflict environments, which implies the need for a 
different approach to development–security 
integration. fifteen of 56 lower-income countries in 
the World bank’s 2011 list also appear on the OECD’s 
list of fragile states, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, 
Angola and Pakistan. Aid volumes are much less 
significant in these contexts relative to other sources 
of foreign exchange and income growth. This raises 
critical questions around the scope for development 
assistance to influence more stable and peaceful social 
conditions. 
Second, demographic change in fragile and failing 
states is putting pressure on entrenched political and 
governance structures and, hence, unsettling aid 
politics. Security sector reform has been a key focus of 
development–security integration since the 1990s, yet 
in places such as Sierra Leone it has had little effect on 
the youth. The interests and 
politics of the burgeoning 
youth population in fragile 
and conflict-affected states 
cannot be ignored, as events 
in the Arab Spring made clear 
(Ezbawy 2011). Jobs is the new 
watchword alongside security 
and justice in these contexts, 
yet it is unclear how to create 
broad-based employment for 
the youth. In the meantime, 
inequalities are worsening, straining governance 
structures and testing the responsiveness of 
development actors (Jolly, Sabates-Wheeler and 
Chattopadhya 2009).
Third, policy processes are becoming more uncertain 
as the influence of traditional donors wanes. recent 
experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia highlight 
the important role of regional players such as Ethiopia, 
Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Newly important donors such 
as China, India and brazil also exert considerable 
influence, which sometimes runs counter to the 
interests and principles of OECD donors, diverse as 
they are.
A ‘new deal’ is required to reshape development–
security integration in light of these developments 
– one that recognises both the limits of understanding, 
influence and capacity to act in insecure environments 
and the importance of local providers of security and 
basic services. 
This report is divided into the following sections. The 
first section examines the changing international and 
local political contexts for development–security 
integration and the major policy problems facing 
international donors. Section two discusses why 
current international policy responses are inadequate 
in this changing environment and calls for a ‘new deal’ 
in the way that development–security integration is 
conceived in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. 
Section three assesses experiences from Kenya and 
Sierra Leone of combining development and security. 
Section four introduces two concepts – entrustment 
and brokerage – for debate and action to anchor a 
‘new deal’, while the conclusion explores the practical 
challenges and implications of adopting a new 
approach for combining development with security 
that is embedded in local security needs.
 POLICy PrOCESSES 
ArE bECOmINg mOrE 
UNCErTAIN AS THE 
INfLUENCE Of 
TrADITIONAL DONOrS 
WANES. 
police in discussion with 
civilians who accuse the 
police force of being 
biased, and shooting 
innocent civilians in 
Nakuru, Kenya.
A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD 1110 iNt grAtiNg C N iNCreASiNgly CompleX WorlD
for many development policymakers and practitioners, 
the incorporation of development within broader 
regimes for security and stabilisation has challenged 
the idea of development aid being an instrument to 
reduce poverty that is targeted to the neediest and 
delivered by actors who are ‘impartial’ and 
‘independent’. Although meanings of development 
are deeply contested, the idea of development as a 
disinterested, altruistic enterprise has long resonated 
with development planners, practitioners, and 
campaigners. yet the political and security contexts for 
development–security integration are rapidly changing. 
many donors now openly acknowledge the inherently 
political nature of development funding and by 
association the activities this supports – particularly in 
fragile states – and no longer treat aid as something 
technocratic and ‘neutral’. Still, some development 
stakeholders struggle to come to terms with this reality. 
for a ‘new deal’ to emerge, the shifting political and 
security environments of fragile and conflict situations 
and the implications of these changes for the political 
positioning of ‘development’ actors need to be known.
2.1 greater multi-polarity, 
greater fluidity
The political context for development–security 
integration is increasingly fluid and shaped by an 
expanding array of actors. While traditional OECD 
donors have assumed a privileged position in 
international affairs, their influence is waning. Non-
OECD donors such as China, India, brazil and Turkey 
are expanding their engagement on issues of peace 
and conflict. recent examples include China’s mediation 
efforts to avoid a resumption of full-blown war 
between Sudan and South Sudan and Turkey’s 
humanitarian and diplomatic engagements in southern 
Somalia, as described below. The OECD provides 
general indications and a set of principles to guide the 
directionality of development aid in fragile states. These 
include maintaining a focus on statebuilding as a central 
objective, prioritising prevention of instability and 
conflict, ensuring aid activities do no harm, promoting 
non-discrimination and avoiding inadvertent exclusion 
of certain areas and groups in aid activities (see box 1). 
yet non-OECD donor approaches to development 
partnership vary greatly with respect to their own 
differing trajectories of development, histories of 
foreign intervention and colonisation, traditions around 
the role of the state and state–society relations, as well 
as their discrete security, political and commercial and 
trade interests. for example, China’s engagement is 
based on a core principle of non-interference in other 
countries’ political affairs, which in practice has meant 
that it has prioritised maintaining stable bilateral 
relations and supporting a top-down model of stability 
(Campbell, Wheeler, Attree et al. 2012). This makes the 
pursuit of and adherence to an agreed set of principles 
for ‘development’ in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations even more difficult.
The influence of rising powers such as brazil, India, 
and China as well as regional powers such as Turkey, 
Ethiopia and Iran, is greatly changing the political space 
for development–security integration. Woods (2008: 
17) explains that emerging donors ‘are introducing 
competitive pressures into the existing system [of 
international development assistance]. They are 
weakening the bargaining position of western donors 
in respect of aid-receiving countries’. This has meant 
that the influence of traditional OECD donors is 
becoming attenuated in politically unstable and 
conflict-affected contexts where they seek to 
intervene. Sri Lanka, which in recent years has been a 
large recipient of Chinese subsidised loans, is a clear 
example of this. Western donors in Sri Lanka have been 
in full retreat. relations with its government led by 
President mahinda rajapaksa soured after it 
abandoned an internationally backed peace 
process and sought a military end to a long-
running insurgency by the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north of the country. 
The offensive culminated in the LTTE 
conceding defeat in may 2009. At the 
height of the fighting between January 
and April 2009, the UN estimated that 
around 6,500 civilians may have been 
killed and another 14,000 wounded. 
Displacement was widespread. Since 
then China has provided concessionary 
loans to the Sri Lankan government to 
fund an infrastructure blitz to link the 
hinterlands with Colombo. Instead of 
pushing the need to strengthen 
security, Western donors have sought to promote a 
peacebuilding approach including power-sharing and 
constitutional reform to protect the interests of 
minority communities.1
In Somalia, Turkey has positioned itself as a key player 
in the country’s ongoing political negotiations as well 
as a humanitarian provider, although this is to the 
disquietude of some development and humanitarian 
actors. The Turkish Prime minister, recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, was the first non-African leader to visit 
Somalia in 20 years when he travelled with his family 
and a retinue of advisors to mogadishu in August 2011. 
Turkey has since opened an embassy in mogadishu and 
pressed the United Nations and other foreign missions 
to relocate their offices to the city, which still are mostly 
based in Nairobi. The Turkish government has financed 
a 400-bed hospital, provided garbage trucks for 
mogadishu, and pledged to build a waste disposal 
facility, pave the road between mogadishu’s airport and 
the city, renovate government buildings and rehabilitate 
agriculture and livestock-related infrastructure 
(Erdogan 2011). Turkish Airlines also began twice-
weekly commercial flights between Istanbul and 
mogadishu. Turkish engagement has made a lasting 
impression on Somali political leaders. Abdulweli 
mohamed Ali, interim Prime minister in the outgoing 
Transitional federal government, told a Western paper 
in July 2012: ‘Since the coming of Turkey there has been 
a paradigm shift… you can do it [reconstruction and 
warfare] simultaneously. you can create peace and 
stability by working on the security side, but also on 
the development side at the same time. That is what 
Turkey is successful at’. yet Turkey’s expanding role in 
Somalia has been challenged as ‘politically naïve’ by 
some diplomats in Nairobi as well as humanitarians. 
The representative of an international development 
and relief organisation working in southern Somalia 
observed,
The UN has lost its relevance because of the 
Turks, Iranians and other non-traditional actors. 
The [former Transitional federal government, 
Tfg] is playing everyone off against one another. 
The government has become stronger because 
of the multiplication of actors. you are either in 
or you’re out, is what the Tfg tends to say. I 
would say that the UN has not pushed back 
more strongly against this… There is a pragmatism 
about what is happening and need to engage 
with it, but also a sense that engagement is not 
happening in a principled manner. Sometimes it 
is more important to take a principled stance 
– if Turks and Qataris act that’s fine but we 
[Western donor and aid agencies] won’t.2
Box 1 oECD: 
ThE 10 FrAGilE STATES PrinCiPlES
1	 take context as the starting point
2	 ensure all activities do no harm
3	 Focus on statebuilding as the central objective
4	 prioritise prevention
5	 recognise the links between political, security and 
development objectives
6	 promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and 
stable societies
7	 Align with local priorities in different ways and in different 
contexts
8	 Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between 
international actors
9	 Act fast… but stay engaged long enough to give success a 
chance
10	Avoid creating pockets of exclusion (‘aid orphans’)
 Sudanese 
rebels from 
the Justice 
and equality 
movement 
(Jem) talking 
to visiting 
journalists at 
their camp 
outside Abeche, 
eastern Chad.
A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD 1312 iNt grAtiNg C N iNCreASiNgly CompleX WorlD
Newly important non-OECD donors like Turkey ‘are 
promoting development assistance deeply entwined 
with trade and investment strategies’ (Woods 2008: 
14), which closely overlap with security and governance 
imperatives in many contexts. As Scoones notes, 
It is of course not the volume of aid that 
matters, but what it does – and in particular 
how it is linked to other forms of investment. 
This is where aid – seen by some (mistakenly) as 
a pure form of giving – gets messy. Aid... is 
always linked to trade interests, investment 
opportunities, security and foreign policy 
agendas... And if this is what the US or UK 
does, why not China and the rest? 
for example, in recent years Turkey has opened or 
upgraded 31 embassies in Africa, mainly to expand its 
commercial ties and provide a beachhead for Turkish 
private investment. Official statistics also indicate that 
Turkey’s trade volume with sub-Saharan Africa 
increased tenfold from US$742 million in 2000 to 
almost US$7.5 billion in 2011 (farrell 2012). Deeper 
security, investment, trade and humanitarian 
engagements by non-OECD countries like Turkey and 
China are challenging the prevailing dominance of 
OECD donors in a number of political contexts, but 
how this might change power relations and political 
formations within particular fragile and conflict-
affected contexts is less certain. 
This greater fluidity of aid relations in fragile and 
conflict-affected states is also apparent in the 
efforts of aid-recipient governments to organise and 
push for new aid priorities that closely couple 
development with security. The g7+ grouping 
representing the governments of 19 conflict-affected 
states endorsed a New Deal for Engagement in 
Fragile States at the High Level forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in busan in November 2011. The New 
Deal defines several overlapping areas of development 
and security cooperation (box 2). At their core, these 
seek to resolve conflict while improving people’s 
security and strengthening their access to justice and 
gainful work.3
Thus, even while many traditional donors have 
struggled to define and operationalise development–
security ties, political actors in aid-recipient countries 
affected by conflict have long realised that enabling 
safety and security in people’s everyday lives is what 
development is fundamentally about. Improvements 
in security and reducing conflict often rank amongst 
the top concerns of populations in fragile and 
conflict-affected states. Local understandings of 
‘security’ may well differ from ‘security’ as it is 
conceived within broader global or regional security 
frameworks, which themselves are complex and 
multifaceted (Luckham 2009). Security for who is 
essential to understanding not only the power 
relations that permeate discrete interventions but 
also their likely effectiveness and implications for 
development actors. In mogadishu, public security 
concerns centre on how to improve neighbourhood 
security, not hunting down terrorists. Likewise, in 
Kenya, where some Western allies of the government 
have pushed it to introduce controversial counter-
terrorism measures and laws, criminal violence, 
impunity, and access to justice for the poor dwarf any 
public concern with terrorism and extremism. In 
Sierra Leone, while the UN Integrated Peacebuilding 
Office in Sierra Leone has planned its exit strategy in 
relation to the 2012 national elections, conflict-
affected communities still contend with issues of 
truth, reconciliation and violence.4
The political context for development–security 
integration is also increasingly shaped by non-state 
violent groups and opposition actors, several of whom 
have grabbed the development mantle by currying 
public favour through the provision of basic services 
and delivery of social support. Prominent examples 
include the delivery of social welfare and services by 
Islamic social welfare organisations in the West bank 
and gaza, many of whom are allied with Hamas (Lind 
2010) and the delivery of relief assistance to victims of 
the 2005 earthquake in Kashmiri Pakistan by members 
of militant groups.
The nexus of development–security is shifting. 
Despite efforts to integrate development and security 
–  in all its complexity, there are limits to influence, 
capacity and knowledge needed to understand 
complex situations on the ground. Understanding 
the politics of complex situations of conflict and 
violence where ‘traditional’ development actors 
and donors may have little influence is a precondition 
for crafting effective aid interventions in these 
settings. So too is a broader political approach that 
moves beyond the usual suspects – government 
representatives, ministry officials, and traditional 
donors and Western NgOs.
2.2 limited influence, mediated 
power
The fragile and conflict-affected contexts where 
combined development–security responses are most 
commonly deployed pose significant challenges for 
delivering effective development. While typically 
nested within a larger framework to build and 
strengthen states, development–security initiatives are 
often quite localised. However, 
their implementation is shaped 
by dynamics and actors in wider 
political settings. The interests 
of different actors will be 
affected differently by the 
delivery and pursuit of particular 
forms of ‘development’. Thus, 
development is something 
inherently politicised and 
contested even when it portrays 
itself as neutral or impartial.
In these contexts power is distributed amongst an 
assortment of state and non-state actors, militaries or 
armed groups, associations and customary social 
structures. Authority is fragmented and security is 
provided through ‘hybrid orders’, referring to ‘places 
in which diverse and competing claims to power and 
logics of order co-exist, overlap and intertwine’ 
(boege, brown, Clements et al. 2008: 10). Thus, the 
abilities of development actors to influence and 
change the drivers of insecurity are necessarily 
abridged and contingent on the partnerships that 
they can create with actors who may be decidedly 
illiberal, or at least incongruent with official 
development objectives in these contexts, such as 
Box 2 ThE FivE MAjor GoAlS oF ThE 
inTErnATionAl DiAloGuE on 
PEACEBuilDinG AnD STATEBuilDinG
1	 Legitimate politics – Foster inclusive political settlements 
and conflict resolution 
2	 Security – establish and strengthen people’s security 
3	 Justice – Address injustices and increase people’s access to 
justice 
4	 Economic foundations – generate employment and 
improve livelihoods 
5	 Revenues and services – manage revenue and build 
capacity for accountable and fair service delivery
 ENAbLINg 
SAfETy AND SECUrITy 
IN PEOPLE’S EvEryDAy 
LIvES IS WHAT 
DEvELOPmENT IS 
fUNDAmENTALLy 
AbOUT. 
 Families flee 
their homes 
in Ajdabiya, 
libya, after 
prolonged 
fighting 
between rebels 
and forces loyal 
to gaddafi.
A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD A New DeAl? DevelopmeNt AND Security iN A chANgiNg worlD 1514 greAter CompleXity, iNADeQuAte reSpoNSeS
3 greater complexity, inadequate 
 responses
greater multi-polarity and fluidity present many 
challenges for development–security integration. many 
current integration efforts are framed in terms of 
stabilisation. In the years following the declaration of 
the War on Terror, stabilisation emerged as a doctrinal 
approach to managing threats emerging from areas 
that were thought to be ‘ungoverned’, such as Somalia 
and the Pakistan–Afghanistan borders, where it was 
feared that terror networks and extremist groups 
would organise and plan attacks. However, many 
subsequent stabilisation efforts – such as in Afghanistan 
– have not overcome constraints on influence, capacity 
and knowledge, and thus their effectiveness has been 
limited, as described below.
3.1 the current framing of the 
development–security nexus
Donor governments continue to pursue ways of 
integrating development and security as increasing 
volumes of development assistance are committed to 
fragile and conflict-affected contexts (see box 3). 
Operationally, development and security are being 
combined through the use of pooled funding, policy 
alignment and the establishment of protocols for 
pairing analysis and planning activities in particular 
contexts, as well as transcending organisational cultures 
of ‘development’ and ‘security’ through the creation 
of liaison positions and regularising the exchange of 
information.
Stabilisation is the latest incarnation in thinking on 
how to combine development 
with security. A stabilisation 
approach stems from an 
understanding that political, 
security, economic and social 
spheres are interdependent: 
failure in one risks failure in 
all others (OECD 2005). 
Therefore, effective responses 
to conflict and fragility must 
include an appropriate balance 
of political, security and development activities. The 
operationalisation of the stabilisation doctrine has been 
done through the whole-of-government approach, 
promoting peace and stability and meeting the needs 
of the most vulnerable. 
The challenge for development actors in these 
situations is to locate ways – both strategically and 
operationally – of working in conditions of mediated 
power and authority. This central need is often missed 
within statebuilding – the strategic framework and 
overriding objective for intervention in such contexts. 
yet a range of recent experiences 
from fragile and conflict-affected 
situations shows that improvements 
in governance and security do not 
emanate from a central state that 
attains a monopoly on violence but 
rather from a constellation of non-
state actors who form hybrid 
political orders, sometimes in partnership with formal 
state actors and governance structures.
In Somaliland, a quasi-state that has achieved an 
impressive level of public security and reconstruction, 
successful statebuilding and peacebuilding emerged 
from below through non-state actors and the 
establishment of local institutions that built on the 
coupling of national and clan politics (Hagmann and 
Hoehne 2009). These local political arrangements 
provided better security for most people compared 
with formal state structures under the government of 
former Somali President Said barre. bradbury argues 
that what collapsed after its downfall was not a 
functioning state but rather an oppressive regime that 
in the words of virginia Luling ‘was suspended above 
a society that would never have produced it and did 
not demand it’ and which for many Somalis was ‘an 
instrument of accumulation and domination, enriching 
and empowering those who control it and exploiting 
and harassing the rest of the population’ (Eubanks 
2010). 
In northern Kenya, local peacebuilding processes in 
the 1990s and early 2000s led by influential community 
members and local civil society working with district 
politico-administrative officials, helped to reduce levels 
of violence. These were galvanised through local efforts 
and encouraged by the Kenyan state, which ceded 
responsibility to non-state actors to improve security in 
a region that was largely beyond its control (menkhaus 
2008).
Such successes contrast sharply with donor-
supported statebuilding efforts in Somalia, Afghanistan 
and elsewhere, which have failed because they have 
not articulated with local processes or the ways in 
which power is constituted within local political orders. 
Healy and Hill (2010: 14) explain that in yemen and 
Somalia ‘power is only partially structured through 
government ministries, if at all. real power remains 
diffused among a host of local actors, with overlapping 
boundaries among clans, business people, Islamists of 
different hues, and a sizeable overseas diaspora’.
The approach used in northern Kenya and Somaliland 
draws on an idea of a ‘mediated state’ – rather different 
from the notion of a Weberian state that is so apparent 
in the statebuilding framework pursued by the aid 
mainstream. Drawing on recent political developments 
in the Horn of Africa, menkhaus explains that the 
strategy of a mediated state is a government–civic 
partnership to execute core state functions and that, 
while not statebuilding, can contribute to building 
locally recognised and trusted modes of local 
governance. These are ‘intrinsically messy, contradictory, 
illiberal, and constantly renegotiated deals’ (menkhaus 
2008: 78). In a mediated state, ‘the government relies 
on partnership (or at least coexistence) with a diverse 
range of local intermediaries and rival sources of 
authority to provide core functions of public security, 
justice, and conflict management’ (menkhaus 2008: 
78). These local authorities ‘mediate’ relations between 
local communities and the state. He writes,
in this approach, the top-down project of 
building a central government and the organic 
emergence of informal polities are not viewed 
as antithetical... but are instead harmonised or 
nested together in a negotiated division of 
labor. The nascent central state limits itself to a 
few essential competencies not already 
provided by local, private sector or voluntary 
sector actors. 
He goes on to explain that so-called ‘local mediators’ 
gain recognition from the state by providing core 
functions of public security or other services demanded 
by local communities, and earning legitimacy as a result 
(menkhaus 2008: 103).
Thus, while development–security initiatives are 
often quite localised, their effectiveness is contingent 
on actors, relationships, agendas, processes and events 
happening in wider political settings. further, power is 
configured by competing stakeholders whose own 
authority is circumscribed and shifting, and not often 
allied with liberal notions that are at the heart of 
Western peacebuilding and conflict prevention work. 
recognition of this realpolitik is too often absent in 
efforts to integrate development with security, as 
explained in the following section.
 STAbILISATION IS 
THE LATEST 
INCArNATION IN 
THINKINg ON HOW TO 
COmbINE DEvELOPmENT 
WITH SECUrITy. 
 rEAL POWEr 
rEmAINS DIffUSED 
AmONg A HOST Of 
LOCAL ACTOrS. 
 indian 
peacekeeping 
troops at a uN 
base near port 
loko, Sierra 
leone.
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where a government actively uses formal and/or 
informal networks across the different agencies 
within that government to coordinate the design and 
implementation of the range of interventions that 
the government’s agencies will be making in order 
to increase the effectiveness of those interventions 
in achieving the desired objectives. (OECD 2006: 14)
Humanitarians as well as some development 
stakeholders have strongly contested stabilisation. In 
the UK, the representative of an international NgO 
engaged in both development and humanitarian 
work commented, ‘I think the rolling out of the 
Building Stability Overseas Strategy will make it 
very dangerous for humanitarians. If you bring 
everything together, there is no humanitarian space’, 
adding,
the project of stabilising societies is not a 
neutral project. It is about imposing a vision of 
what you want that society to look like. As long 
as there is this hypocrisy [within stabilisation 
agendas generally] that we need to preserve 
humanitarian space, even though it is fatally 
compromised, we won’t get anywhere.5 
The centrality of the humanitarian imperative 
and being perceived as independent of competing 
political standpoints (apart from the aim of assisting 
those in need) are core principles of the Code of 
Conduct for the International red Cross and red 
Crescent movement, the touchstone for 
humanitarianism by relief agencies. yet these principles 
run counter to the objectives of development–security 
integration that form the basis of peacebuilding and 
statebuilding work. An advocacy official for an 
international NgO that delivers humanitarian aid 
explained,
The Chilcot inquiry, together with the Strategic 
Defense and Security Review (SDSr) and the Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy (bSOS) mark an evolution 
in strategic thinking on how to couple development 
and security, with a greater emphasis on upstream 
conflict prevention and, implicitly, less emphasis 
on statebuilding. 
The logic of integration nonetheless remains 
central to bSOS, and was recommended in the 
SDSr. bSOS seeks to: strengthen the UK 
government’s strategic conflict assessment for early 
warning and prevention; create an Early Action 
facility within the Conflict Pool incorporating both 
ODA and non-ODA funds to support the rapid 
deployment of UK resources in conflict situations; 
and expand the use of Stabilisation response Teams 
that integrate military, police, civil servants and other 
experts – a mechanism that was deployed in Libya to 
support the National Transitional Council in benghazi.
Box 3 ThE MErGinG oF DEvEloPMEnT AnD SECuriTy in uK ovErSEAS AiD
In environments like the Democratic republic 
of Congo and South Sudan, where there are 
pockets of war but also pockets where 
development is happening, an integrated 
approach doesn’t work. If I am working with 
the government in one area, but working with 
a rebel group in another, I may not be able to 
access all areas where assistance is needed if the 
overriding objective of the mission is a political 
one... Stabilising societies is taking a large-scale 
view. but in most fragile states, you take a 
micro-level view. Every area is a micro context. 
you need to negotiate access separately with 
local actors, whoever these may be.6
A senior UN official on Somalia offered a diverging 
assessment:
There is an inherent philosophical problem for 
humanitarian agencies when they talk of 
humanitarian space when there is a need for 
longer-term solutions to a more stable 
environment. This requires political actions and 
engagements. So I think there is a challenge 
when humanitarian actors tend to see any acts 
toward stabilisation as initially against their 
interest. 
It shouldn’t be either or – humanitarian 
response or stabilisation. There is not a right 
model for stabilisation. NgOs could focus more 
on developing activities that are conflict-
reducing. There are some things happening – 
developing quick employment – which have a 
positive effect on conflict reduction. The big aid 
expenditure outside humanitarianism is security 
expenditure. Only peanuts are being thrown at 
stabilisation – max of $40 million. Last year 
humanitarian response was 1.3 billion, 90 per 
cent went through UN agencies and NgOs… I 
think NgO argument is over-cautious. People 
have not been willing to look at opportunities 
as they develop… All organisations have 
retreated into their comfort zones. Part of that 
is because of the very difficult security 
environment [in southern Somalia].7
fundamentally, there is a tension between the 
humanitarian imperative to maintain operations and 
access to populations under threat and the objective 
of building peace, which is inherently political and 
fraught. The head of a peacebuilding organisation 
explained, 
Development assistance is not extended 
humanitarian assistance or assistance by 
another name. There is a similar language, the 
same agencies and funding sources might be 
involved, and the same people are getting 
In common with many other donors, reducing fragility 
and conflict has become one of the core aims of the 
UK’s bilateral development assistance. The 1997 
International Development White Paper first 
mentioned that conflict was an impediment to 
economic progress and sustainable development 
(DfID 1997: 5). The same year, DfID established the 
Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department. In 
subsequent years, there was an intensifying focus on 
conflict-affected contexts within DfID’s strategic 
thinking and operations.
The new collaboration between DfID, fCO and mOD 
resulted in the setting up of the Stabilisation Unit, replacing 
what had been the Post Conflict reconstruction Unit. 
further, peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives 
were integrated within the mandates of each 
department, as well. for example, the DfID practice 
paper on Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and 
Fragile Situations notes that DfID’s mandate is to 
strengthen institutional capacities to reduce and 
prevent conflict and human suffering and to reach the 
mDgs in situations of fragility and violence (DfID 2010b).
As a result, aid allocations to fragile states have 
expanded significantly, doubling over the period 
2006–2011. The 2009 White Paper commits at least 
50 per cent of all new bilateral country aid to fragile 
states, with a focus on peacebuilding and statebuilding. 
Of all aid to developing countries, one third is allocated 
to fragile states. for some critics, this trend confirms 
that there is a ‘securitisation of aid’. The definitional 
criteria of overseas development assistance (ODA) has 
been relaxed to allow aid spending on some aspects 
of the security sector (i.e. SSr) but still excludes direct 
support to foreign militaries. In the United States, ODA 
managed by the Pentagon has jumped from 3.5 per 
cent of overall ODA spending in 1998 to 22 per cent 
in 2005 (malan 2008). but there is no common way 
of reporting on foreign security assistance amongst 
DAC donors and it is therefore difficult to clearly 
identify any trend. In the UK, the International 
Development Act of 2002 has helped to ensure that 
potentially competing objectives of other foreign policy 
and national security priorities do not overwhelm 
development objectives. 
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involved and flying in. but they are not the 
same. Development is a different process to 
humanitarian assistance, and it ought to be. 
Development assistance is a part of the way we 
relate to the world... Isn’t it part of foreign 
policy and don’t we have to grasp this?8
Debates around stabilisation and its implications for 
humanitarian action and local development work 
highlight the political nature of development–security 
integration. They also reveal the fragmented and 
constructed categories that external donors and 
agencies have created. In fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts, these distinctions are often not so neat, 
hence the difficulty of seeking to carve out clearly 
separate fields of practice between development, 
humanitarian and security work.
3.2 Beyond stabilisation and 
statebuilding
building and rebuilding institutions is now the core 
activity of most security–development interventions. 
Under the rubric of stabilisation and statebuilding, donors 
have focused on recreating a new political order that 
would reproduce a Western state-centric model of 
security and development. While earlier peacebuilding 
experiences have failed largely as a result of the lack of 
focus on institutional building, the current approach 
has many shortcomings, in particular the tension 
between human and state security priorities and the 
short-term political agenda to achieve this goal.
The international community has failed up to now 
to realise the limited influence, capacity and knowledge 
it can have through development–security integration. 
The focus on statebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected 
contexts is symptomatic of 
this thinking. rather, the key 
is to find ways to work 
alongside informal power 
structures that can often 
involve actors with decidedly 
illiberal aims. The international 
community have up to now 
failed to provide particular 
tools and guidelines on how 
this can be achieved. 
beyond stabilisation and 
statebuilding, development–
security approaches in 
general suffer from linear 
and equilibrium thinking. Indeed, conflict is often 
correlated with fragility and is seen as an impediment 
to development rather than as something intrinsic to 
the dynamics and processes of change. for example, 
the UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy targets the 
tier of countries below the ‘fragile’ threshold to 
activate its early warning strategies. However, shocks 
may be more important than long-term drivers of 
fragility, as shown in the recent revolutions and 
uprisings in the middle East and North Africa. Herman 
van rompuy, President of the EU Council, noted, ‘The 
events in Tunisia and Egypt remind all of us that 
stability can lead to immobility. betting on stability 
alone therefore cannot be the ultimate answer’. 
Overall, the underlying logic that development and 
security are mutually reinforcing is questionable. It is 
assumed that insecurity is anathema to development 
and that development can contribute to stability and 
prevent conflict. However, the resilience and even 
expansion of various forms of trade and marketing 
activity in Somalia show how markets do often 
continue to function in situations that are unstable 
and where there is no functioning central political 
authority. Economies continue to grow in so-called 
fragile states – sometimes rapidly – such as Angola, 
Sudan, Ethiopia and Côte d’Ivoire. Development 
transitions are often deeply fraught, giving rise to new 
forms of conflict and violence, rather than resulting 
in more peaceful and stable conditions. This critique 
essentially points to a poor understanding of political 
dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected situations. 
The focus on stability also fails to qualify whose 
development and whose stability. While it may be 
already questionable whether development brings 
stability, this correlation ignores how the structure of 
society may have changed, and who benefits and who 
loses from these transformations. This tendency to see 
a one-way relationship between development and 
conflict misses the potential impact of development 
(and elections) on conflict. 
Overall, there is a significant gap between policy and 
practice (OECD 2011). While development and 
security planners alike are aware of the many challenges 
and contradictions inherent in implementing 
development–security initiatives, policy responses are 
dealt with in technocratic or strategic terms: increasing 
funding and political commitments or developing 
better technical knowledge of staff involved in reform 
(de Coning 2011). However, poor understanding of 
political dynamics in fragile and conflict-affected 
situations is a major impediment to crafting 
development–security responses that more effectively 
address the forms of violence and insecurity that 
undermine development and wellbeing for people 
living in these areas.
4 learning from the ground: 
 development–security integration 
 in Kenya and Sierra leone
much development–security work is localised. 
However, debates on development–security integration 
often focus on overarching policy and strategy, thus 
tending to highlight differences in broad principles and 
ideologies rather than shared difficulties of responding 
more effectively in complex political and security 
contexts. Insights are missing from the ground where 
development and security actors converge as well as 
work separately on a range of objectives. Drawing from 
examples in Kenya and Sierra Leone, this section 
critically assesses the experiences of discrete initiatives 
that sought to combine development with security. In 
both countries, development has been incorporated 
over a long period into wider responses to conflict, 
instability and violence. yet the push for development–
security integration in Kenya and Sierra Leone has 
arisen from very different places. 
In Kenya, donors have supported a variety of 
initiatives to address the perceived causes of 
radicalisation and violence, which are nested in wider 
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which devolves considerable authority and funds to 
‘county’-level political-administrative structures. 
representatives of bilateral missions in Nairobi openly 
worry about ‘balkanisation’ and the creation of 
devolved patronage operating within ‘many local 
fiefdoms’, ‘little empires’ at the county level.12 
Already there have been some worrying signs of this 
happening, with violence flaring in peripheral counties 
that were long marginalised under Kenya’s old political 
system. A Kenyan observer of these conflicts explained: 
Devolution is having a great impact. In the 
north, communities are trying to position 
themselves in how they’ll fit in with the county 
government system. In moyale [on the Kenya–
Ethiopia border], it is about whether the gabra 
or boran will build a coalition with other tribes 
to capture the government. It is competition 
for political power. for the marginalised 
counties, people are looking at the resources 
that will flow to the counties. Clans are 
positioning themselves to get a share of the 
cake. In moyale, people have burned farms, 
schools and homes. People were being killed 
on site. They [attackers] were destroying ID and 
voting cards… because of the expectations that 
there will be devolution of resources to counties, 
this is fuelling a scramble. [Local-level political 
leaders] are eager to get a chunk of the funds.13
Spiralling violence compounds fears that Kenya’s 
political institutions are ill equipped to respond to youth 
unemployment and widening inequalities. There were 
development initiatives in the early years of the War 
on Terror to support outreach to muslim youth who it 
was feared were being recruited by terrorist groups. 
youth were enlisted by different political factions to 
carry out violence in the aftermath of the disputed 
election in December 2007. Since then, the Kenyan 
government and many bilateral development agencies 
have sought to tailor initiatives for young people to 
prevent conflict. The Kenyan government established a 
youth Development fund that provides low-interest 
loans to youth through banks. ‘yes youth Can’, a $45 
million US-funded five-year programme, supported 
the establishment of a national youth forum composed 
of elected representatives as well as an innovation fund 
for youth ‘economic empowerment’.14 
responses to internal conflict in the country as well as 
instability in Somalia. The case study examines a 
DANIDA-supported initiative in Kenya’s Coast Province 
that operated through a remarkable degree of trust 
and ownership with local civic society groups, who 
redefined both the implied understanding of ‘security’ 
in the programme as well as approaches to address 
locally felt insecurities. The case study shows how 
global security concerns are filtered through a desire 
to both prevent a recurrence of election-related 
violence, and engage thoughtfully in a complex sub-
national political economy marked by the drug trade 
and ethnicised political violence.
Sierra Leone is widely viewed as one of the more 
successful cases of post-conflict reconstruction, which 
has been spearheaded in part through the United 
Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra 
Leone. Since the civil war officially ended in 2002, the 
country has avoided a relapse into wide-scale conflict, 
and successfully organised national elections in 2007 
and 2012. yet significant challenges remain, including 
youth marginalisation and violence carried out by gangs 
and ‘secret societies’. There have been effective local 
efforts to address these challenges, which implicitly 
link development with security. yet, so far, these efforts 
are largely disconnected from larger peacebuilding 
operations in the country.
4.1 risky business: crafting a 
role for development in Kenya’s 
changing political and security 
contexts
4.1.1 Background
Kenya embodies the challenge faced by official 
development actors across many contexts that were 
long thought to be relatively peaceful and stable: how 
to adapt development responses to the changing 
dynamics of internal politics and violence while also 
maintaining a position that does not compromise 
fundamental principles and public attitudes of 
development as advancing wider public interests and 
needs. The Horn of Africa emerged as a frontline in 
the global War on Terror as attention shifted beyond 
Afghanistan and Iraq to Somalia and its neighbours. 
Several countries including the US and UK quietly 
pressured the Kenyan government to institute a raft of 
counter-terrorism measures that were strongly 
opposed by sections of Kenyan civil society as well as 
muslim leaders. The involvement of multiple foreign 
governments in renditions of terror suspects and the 
passing of draconian anti-terror laws in donor countries 
weakened the moral authority of donor countries that 
were seeking to court public opinion in Kenya and 
challenge the appeal of extremist ideologies (ruteere 
and Ogada 2010). The US ramped up military responses 
in the region, including establishing a counter-terrorism 
listening post in Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task 
force – Horn of Africa (CJTf-HOA), and expanding a 
network of drone bases in Ethiopia and the Seychelles 
to collect intelligence and launch attacks inside Somalia.
Development became an integral part of wider 
responses to presumed threats to stability in the region. 
military actors including the CJTf-HOA carried out 
local-level social development work, which was roundly 
criticised by some development actors (bradbury and 
Kleinman 2010) but also welcomed by some local 
populations that directly benefited.9 many efforts 
to develop development–security work were 
experimental at first, such as supporting civil society to 
promote a public debate on the need for counter-
terrorism measures, and various outreach efforts with 
sections of muslim civil society, which before had been 
off the radar of most donor agencies. These did not 
entail a major refocus of development resources or 
aims yet they were still questioned by members of 
Kenya’s civil society and international NgO aid actors 
(Howell and Lind 2010). In particular, the motives of 
such efforts were criticised as putting the security 
interests of Western countries above the needs and 
interests of ordinary Kenyans. many pointed out that 
such initiatives were disconnected from the everyday 
insecurities felt by most people, such as muggings and 
carjackings, gang violence, vigilantism and police 
harassment, as well as a judicial system that failed to 
serve the poor. Some aid actors worried openly that it 
was dangerous to use development resources, however 
small, for initiatives in support of security objectives, 
arguing that such support blurred the lines between 
development aid and a wider range of counter-
terrorism responses in the Horn that generated 
significant controversy, including air strikes on targets 
in Somalia and a regional rendition programme.
In spite of these concerns in the early years of the 
War on Terror, development–security linkages in Kenya 
have become more widely institutionalised over time. 
Development donors including the US and UK have 
sought to operationalise a whole-of-government 
approach by more closely integrating their bilateral 
development assistance with political and defence 
operations.10 In part this is because of the post-election 
violence that rocked Kenya in early 2008, which led 
many bilateral donors to move conflict prevention to 
the centre of their aid strategies.11 Even while bilateral 
donors have pushed to integrate development and 
security, the focus and aims of these linkages have 
moved with Kenya’s changing security and political 
contexts. Kenya confronts external stressors generated 
by the conflict in Somalia while managing internal 
pressures arising from its transition into political and 
governance structures established under a new 
constitution. many development stakeholders fear the 
consequences of the new constitutional dispensation, 
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Over time there has been a shift from designing 
development–security initiatives for narrow counter-
terrorism purposes to reshaping development 
responses generally to address the factors contributing 
to violence and instability in Kenya’s fast-changing 
political economy. These responses are still inflected by 
the security interests of donor countries to promote 
regional stability and thwart terrorist activity, but they 
are filtered through more immediate concerns to 
prevent Kenya fragmenting along ethnic and regional 
lines. However, development donors are coming up 
against limits to understanding the intricacies of political 
and security dynamics, particularly at the local level. The 
representative of a European bilateral agency explained, 
very few internationals have the scope or 
intelligence to understand county politics in this 
country. We don’t know what happens, we 
only know who says what. If you look at 
previous election-related violence, you look at 
the candidates for parliament and president to 
understand the situation. but there is a far 
more complex picture now.15
4.1.2 DANiDA peace, Security and 
Development programme in Coast province, 
Kenya
The coastal belt of Kenya centreing on the port of 
mombasa has been an important focus of development 
and security efforts in Kenya since the declaration of 
the War on Terror. Predominantly muslim, the coastal 
belt has a unique social and political history rooted in 
the region’s Swahili-speaking societies as well as its 
administration by the Portuguese and the Sultans of 
Oman and Zanzibar in Kenya’s pre-colonial period. 
Security concerns have focused on Kenya’s weak 
intelligence and ineffective policing and prosecution 
capacities, making it difficult to track and detain terror 
suspects. There is also concern that a ‘complicit society’ 
engendered by underdevelopment and political 
marginalisation of the coast’s indigenous population 
since the country’s independence in 1963 has tolerated 
the presence of extremists. 
The Coast was spared the worst of the post-election 
violence in 2008 but since then violence has flared 
around a complex set of issues, including regional 
inequalities and the perceived domination of 
‘upcountry’ elites, land tenure disputes, and large-scale 
‘development’ – such as the establishment of large 
commercial farms and the development of a new port 
facility at Lamu – that preclude local interests. A 
movement for secession of the Coast region, 
spearheaded by the mombasa republic Council (mrC), 
has gained momentum. The mrC has grown into a 
potent political force, morphing into a network that is 
implicated in acts of violence, such as destroying 
election posts and burning vehicles belonging to the 
Election Commission. A Kenyan official in a European 
bilateral development agency explained, ‘The mrC is 
not homogenous – it is unstructured. Each coastal area 
has its own mrC issue’.16 Kenyan authorities have 
struggled to respond. They proscribed the organisation, 
which only seemed to energise greater support for the 
movement. At times they have sought to initiate a 
dialogue with the mrC, and at other times they have 
ignored them.17  One donor agency official commented, 
‘The government is hesitant. They don’t want to send 
in the military or police like they have used against other 
proscribed groups. The government is perplexed. They 
have not before sought to negotiate with a prescribed 
group’. Politicians have been quick to try to tap into 
the deep vein of tension fuelling the mrC while also 
implicating the mrC whenever violence flares, and also 
to link it with Al-Shabaab, the militant organisation 
based in southern Somalia. It is rumoured that Al-
Shabaab pays $1,000/month to new recruits who will 
fight in Somalia.18 While it is thought that the mrC and 
Al-Shabaab draw from the same sense of youth 
disenfranchisement there is no evidence of any direct 
link between the organisations.
The Peace, Security and Development (PSD) 
programme was initiated by the Danish embassy in 
Nairobi in 2005 under the rubric of the Danish 
government’s broader framework of the ‘Principles 
governing Danish Development Assistance for the 
fight against New Terrorism’. It began as an 
experimental initiative of the Danish ambassador to 
Kenya and was precipitated by the crisis that ensued 
following the publication of cartoons depicting the 
prophet mohammed in a Danish newspaper. A specific 
objective of the programme is ‘stabilisation in Kenya 
and the region by the promotion of human security 
through “soft” interventions aimed at countering 
radicalisation and violence’. An official familiar with the 
programme remarked: 
This programme recognises there are unique 
challenges in Coast Province. There are 
ingredients for radicalisation. So this 
programme is working in different areas where 
it can promote dialogue, help the citizens in the 
area to come together and improve their 
welfare so that you reduce the interest of 
anyone in activities that may foster or 
encourage them to go into radical activities. by 
radicalisation, I am choosing not to say 
‘terrorism’… even though there is a relation.19
A fundamental problem confronting development–
security initiatives such as PSD is the attempt to address 
global and local security concerns alike. While global 
and local security concerns are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, too often the overt pursuit of external 
political and security interests through development, 
and the perception that development donors are 
aligned with states in the region that are antagonistic 
to the interests of some communities and populations, 
belies any notion that development–security initiatives 
serve local needs and priorities.
DANIDA officials approached a number of civil 
society groups in the Coast region to help shape the 
programme, including the Coast Interfaith Clerics’ 
Council (CICC), muslims for Human rights (mUHUrI), 
Likoni Community Development Programme 
(LICODEP), Ujamaa Centre and the Council of Imams 
and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK). The groups worked 
across a range of local security issues and curried local 
favour and legitimacy. When DANIDA began working 
with these groups, not all of them were legally 
registered and some relied on volunteer time and 
contributions, yet all of them were rooted in grassroots 
networks. Entrusting these local partners to help 
define the security issues to be addressed was a way 
for the Danish government to negotiate the delicacies 
of pursuing its political and security interests in a local 
political setting in Kenya where its influence was 
negligible and perceptions of its power were 
unfavourable amongst the targeted populations.
following an initial meeting, the groups went away 
for one year tasked with helping to define their 
respective priorities, objectives and activities for 
working in the programme. The groups redefined the 
programme’s scope to focus on locally felt security 
concerns, including facilitating inter-faith dialogue, 
monitoring human rights infringements by the police 
and other actors, and preventing and resolving conflict. 
At the outset, the groups insisted that any reference 
to ‘terrorism’ be removed from official programme 
documentation. They argued that this did not reflect 
the interests and concerns of Coast populations and 
that to be relevant the programme needed to articulate 
with local conflicts, tensions and frustrations amongst 
the youth that were thought to contribute to insecurity. 
for example, raids in muslim neighbourhoods by the 
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit had caused public outrage 
and the consternation of muslim leaders whose support 
was sought in counter-radicalisation efforts. moreover, 
the police would hold terror suspects for lengthy 
periods in undisclosed locations, moving them 
frequently between different police stations so that it 
was more difficult for them to maintain contact with 
their families or legal representatives. Some were 
renditioned to Somalia and Ethiopia and, in one 
instance, to guantanamo bay. 
In 2011 the PSD was formally incorporated into the 
governance portfolio of DANIDA in Kenya and funding 
was extended for a further five-year period, with an 
overarching objective to enhance engagement with 
government agencies and other stakeholders to 
promote peace and security ‘as the basis for democratic 
development at the coastal areas of Kenya’. Working 
separately, the groups have partnered with local 
religious leaders, elders and youth to organise forums 
to discuss community security and inter-faith 
cooperation, peace sermons (khutbas), football 
matches, and poetry competitions in schools and 
madrassas (Islamic schools). The radicalisation of youth 
is a widely shared concern amongst all of the PSD 
groups, and was an important rationale for introducing 
the programme. youth were enlisted by political leaders 
to perpetrate violence in the aftermath of Kenya’s last 
disputed national elections in 2008; some youth have 
travelled to southern Somalia drawn by the prospect 
of being paid to fight for armed groups such as Al-
Shabaab. LICODEP, a community organisation focusing 
on youth issues, is different from the other PSD groups 
in that it operates only in the Likoni and Kwale areas 
south of mombasa that are the base for extremist 
groups such as Kaya bombo, which was involved in 
political violence that rocked the Coast in 1997. 
LICODEP established a microcredit facility to provide 
capital for at-risk youth to start businesses. Similarly, a 
pilot initiative of CICC, the Kwale Inter-faith youth 
Association, began as a self-help project in 2006 and 
now provides small business loans to youth. between 
2006 and 2008, 2,000 youth benefited from the 
scheme, starting businesses such as motorcycle taxi 
firms (boda boda) and beauty shops as well as investing 
in farming. The initiative has since branched out into an 
independent, youth-led initiative organisation providing 
business skills and credit opportunities to youth.
The PSD groups address issues having a strong 
resonance with local communities. An evaluation of 
the PSD found that the organisations were highly 
motivated, competent, and had successfully cultivated 
the local legitimacy needed for the programme’s 
success (Adili Consulting 2009). The PSD-supported 
groups feel they have wide discretion to determine 
their activities and the partnerships they form on the 
ground.20 While PSD is rooted in an anti-terrorism 
framework which envisions the groups contributing to 
Danish security interests, in practice the groups have 
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encountered little fiddling by Danish officials in setting 
their agendas and cultivating ties with local 
stakeholders, which have included armed youth, 
mosque preachers, and terror suspects. An evaluation 
of the project concluded that the high degree of local 
ownership was an encouraging sign of the potential 
sustainability of these groups, even though they relied 
substantially on Danish support (Adili Consulting 2009). 
To explain how the groups were able to make space 
for addressing locally defined security interests, a 
Kenyan analyst who has studied the PSD programme 
argued, 
The first person who kicks the ball [the Danish 
government] is not what matters but rather it 
is the interactions and decisions between actors 
that make all the difference to what happens. 
The PSD-supported groups reshaped the 
project in their own interests, depending on 
their own contacts and other resources they 
could bring in. This greatly affected the 
outcomes that were seen.21 
Ironically, the success of the PSD programme – now a 
pillar of DANIDA’s governance work in Kenya – raises 
new challenges. In the current phase of the programme, 
DANIDA is seeking to professionalise the PSD groups 
through training in financial and programme 
management. The PSD groups now must reconcile this 
greater emphasis on professionalism with attributes of 
being nimble and accountable to local actors in Coast 
Province.
Although Danish security interests were key 
motivations for starting the PSD,22 Danish officials have 
trod carefully to embed the programme in local security 
concerns. Still, the enmeshing of Danish political and 
security interests in the PSD has been criticised 
(bachmann and Honke 2009). One aid official in 
Nairobi who was familiar with the PSD programme 
commented, ‘you must also understand the political 
benefit of this programme for Denmark. Whenever 
these anti-Islam sentiments crop up [in Denmark], our 
relationship with these groups allows us to quell any 
protests that might come up’.23 At times Denmark has 
struggled to address the inherent contradictions arising 
from its support for the PSD and its wider political and 
commercial engagements in Kenya. for example, some 
PSD local actors have strongly opposed the Kenyan 
government’s plans to develop a port facility at Lamu, 
which has attracted interest from the Danish shipping 
giant maersk. Aid, even when used innovatively in the 
case of the PSD programme, cannot be neatly 
separated out from security and trade interests, or from 
the wider political economies of places where 
development donors seek to intervene. yet this does 
not preclude the possibility of external assistance 
enabling worthwhile activities around local security 
priorities in challenging contexts.
4.2 Security first, development 
forgotten in Sierra leone: is the 
ground not teaching us what it is 
all about? 
4.2.1 Sierra leone, a ‘success’ story for 
uNipSil and its Agenda for Change
Sierra Leone is viewed by the international community 
as a success story in terms of the development–security 
nexus, ‘one of Africa’s most successful post-conflict 
states’ (Africa research Institute 2011). DfID highlights 
its experience in Sierra Leone as a successful policy 
practice to inform its thinking on security sector reform 
and security and justice (DfID 2010a). On the UN side, 
the UN Secretary-general ban Ki-moon declared that 
it is ‘the best and most advanced UN integrated 
peacebuilding mission’ (rfI 2010). yet significant 
development challenges persist in Sierra Leone. It has 
one of the highest youth unemployment rates 
worldwide. An estimated 60–70 per cent of young 
people do not have a job, and there are few prospects 
for a regular and stable income. It is the world’s 11th 
poorest country (UNDP 2010), ranking near the bottom 
of the Human Development Index. This may be 
surprising given the country’s mineral wealth, 
particularly in diamonds and iron ore. However, donor-
driven mineral-for-development reforms have failed to 
significantly reduce poverty due to elite-driven patron–
client networks surrounding mineral exploitation (Zulu 
and Wilson 2012). Thus, even though international 
observers have hailed Sierra Leone’s progress in 
preventing a relapse into wide-scale conflict, this has 
not translated into significant development progress.
The United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office 
in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) was created in 2008 as a 
follow-up to the peacekeeping mission (UNAmSIL). 
UNIPSIL, along with UN agencies, funds and 
programmes working as the UN Country Team in Sierra 
Leone, adopted a Joint vision under which they agreed 
to combine their efforts to bring together the UN’s 
various political, humanitarian and development 
mandates. The Joint vision has 21 programmes defined 
with four programmatic priorities, namely the 
economic integration of rural areas, the economic and 
social integration of the youth, an equitable access to 
health services and an accessible and credible public 
service. The Joint vision defines the UN’s contribution 
to implementing the government’s ‘Agenda for 
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Change’, the government’s poverty reduction strategy. 
Key strategic priorities are underpinned by measures to 
consolidate peace, ensure good governance and 
develop an enabling environment for economic 
growth.
4.2.2 youth marginalisation and violence
Development–security integration in post-war Sierra 
Leone, encapsulated in the objectives of the Joint 
vision and the Agenda for Change, is also thought to 
have been successful insofar as it has prevented a 
relapse into widespread violent conflict. yet this 
overlooks many challenges that still threaten renewed 
conflict in the country, including youth marginalisation 
and unemployment, and localised violence involving 
gangs and ‘secret societies’. There are still many violent 
incidents nowadays. One can see an increase in urban 
violence, especially in the east and central parts of 
freetown. This is a relatively new development linked 
to music labels (e.g. black Leo), which has led to the 
development of a new gang war culture. Another 
aspect of this urban violence is the formation of gangs 
or cults in secondary schools, universities and colleges. 
In universities and colleges they start as sororities and 
fraternities and end up as cults usually called ‘black man’ 
and ‘white man’. In rural areas, the key issues relate to 
land rights. In Sierra Leone’s diamond mining district, 
the youth assert what they consider to be their personal 
rights to dispose of real property at the expense of 
older practices that subject property to the dictates and 
interests of ‘customary authorities’ that many view as 
corrupt. The decision by the international community 
to restore the Paramount Chief system of local 
administration in Sierra Leone and their customary 
rights to land is not without problems and has created 
and continues to create conflict and violence between 
the traditional elders and the youth.
Whereas official approaches to development–
security integration assume first the need to establish 
peace followed by development and a resumption of 
‘normality’, local informal governance shows this is a 
myth. Local informal governance closely couples actions 
that might be regarded as ‘development’ with the 
maintenance of order and efforts to stymie tensions 
and violence. While the prevention of a resumption of 
wide-scale conflict might suggest that development–
security integration has indeed succeeded in Sierra 
Leone, this masks wider structural issues including the 
unmet aspirations of youth, their continued 
marginalisation, and localised violence. Indeed, the 
‘youth problem’ has been regarded mainly in terms of 
the need to support ex-combatants through the 
Disarmament-Demobilisation-reintegration (DDr) 
process. This overlooks the potential role of violence 
and organised crime in relation to a lack of work and 
opportunities for young people. Popular music by 
young people during the 2007 elections showed a 
bigger malaise and security concern about the 
corruption of the ruling party and lack of opportunities 
for youth advancement (Shelper 2010). 
Despite the fact that the economic and social 
integration of the youth is one of the four 
programmatic priorities of the Joint vision, 
international donors have only slowly awakened to 
the need to address the security and development 
needs of young people. michael von der Schulenburg, 
the former Secretary-general’s Executive 
representative and Head of UNIPSIL, noted in march 
2010 that there had been relatively few tangible 
programmes to make a significant impact on the lives 
of the sizeable number of jobless young people (UN 
2010). This can be partly explained by the lack of 
funding, and inadequate youth employment approaches. 
UNIPSIL has failed to attract sufficient funding for the 
implementation of the Joint vision. Only a third (33 
per cent) of the 21 programmes were funded in 2009, 
and in 2012, just half (50 per cent) of the programmes 
were properly funded. youth employment approaches, 
which rely exclusively on rural-based, growth-oriented 
policies, are not thought to be able to resolve the 
youth employment problem in Sierra Leone (Sommers 
2007), both because the challenges are too large and 
complex and because the approach runs directly 
against the persistent advance of urbanisation and 
informal market activities.
for nearly a decade, young people have been 
excluded from the peace accord and the political 
economy and have been portrayed by the international 
community and the political elites as a risk group. 
During the 2007 elections, for example, the SLPP 
(Sierra Leone People’s Party) manifesto described 
marginalised youth as a ‘security challenge that must 
be given appropriate attention to help the country 
consolidate peace’, while the APC (All People’s 
Congress ) presidential candidate declared that ‘the 
youth problem has become chronic, with a potential 
for explosion’ (Christensen and Utas 2008). The other 
side of policy concern of youth marginalisation is that 
youth are stigmatised as a destabilising force in the 
country. many young people object to being branded 
as outlaws, misfits, and the source of insecurity.24 The 
creation of the youth Employment Scheme (yES) 
followed later by the setting up of the National youth 
Commission (NAyCOm) will hopefully provide better 
integration of youth issues in development–security 
planning. A member of the youth Commission 
explained,
We in the youth Commission have been very 
mindful about this transition and are aware of 
the fact that it had to be handled with the 
greatest care if it should not take us back to the 
war (i.e. if the causes of the past war are not 
addressed – youth marginalisation, and social 
exclusion, lack of space for youths and women, 
youth unemployment, etc.).25 
The youth Commission is now finally alert to the need 
to build youth self-esteem and promote their voice in 
policy spaces. They have set up youth advisory 
committees and empower them to manage and 
monitor projects within the community. 
4.2.3 on the ground: an alternative to 
official development–security integration
In the Eastern and Southern provinces – an area rich 
in mineral resources especially alluvial diamond mining 
– many ex-combatants never participated in DDr 
programmes. The central government remains quite 
suspicious of these combatants, as most of them were 
part of the CDf (Civil Defence forces). International 
and national efforts to integrate development and 
security have had little impact on the ground in this 
part of Sierra Leone. An executive of the bike riders 
Association (brA) in baoma Town, bo district 
commented:
No one contacted us and we believe we are an 
important constituency in the youth ministry 
and even the newly formed Commission, but 
we are constantly marginalised because we are 
either former combatants or we are maybe in a 
village or possibly because we have tried to 
create some form of employment for ourselves 
and our compatriots… We are gradually 
concluding that the government only helps 
those youths who are involved in politics or 
who do not use their own initiative to start any 
business or create employment – or that it is a 
crime to be ingenious.26
While youth are still viewed as a risk group, they have 
developed their own networks (fanthorpe and 
maconochie 2010). These are often organised around 
the discrete economic interests and livelihood needs 
of youth, such as the brA, the Cassette Sellers 
Association (CSAs), the Sweizzy Sellers Association 
(SSA), and the belgium Sellers Association (bSA). The 
brA, for example, represents a group of mostly 
ex-combatants mainly from the CDf that were 
transporting troops and now use their skills as taxi bike 
drivers, while the SSA works on foreign currency 
exchange. These examples show how the youth, even 
before the involvement of NAyCOm, have managed 
to organise themselves to address their needs without 
any form of government or donor intervention. 
Solidarity has developed among the youth members 
of these associations. While most observers regard 
these associations as an encouraging sign of peaceful 
development, these also play a role in providing security 
and safety at the local level through a set of informal 
rules and through their collaboration with the security 
forces. In a post-conflict local context, one can see that 
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the definitions of what is a development worker or a 
security provider are much more blurred. In the 
following paragraphs, we will see how these 
associations help to manage tension and prevent 
violent outcomes. 
Local Unit Commanders (LUCs) are aware of the 
potential danger that violent incidents or crime-related 
activities could have in creating local or regional 
instability. Instead of seeing youth as a risk group, LUCs 
have sought to mediate between young people and 
the government. In the cities of Kenema and bo, LUCs 
are now working with these groups to reduce drug-
related crimes in their operational areas. This is the case 
in the Eastern and Southern provinces where the LUCs 
gather information from the brA on matters such as 
armed robbery, robbery with aggravation, and murder, 
among other crimes. Chief Superintendent of the LUC 
in bo explained, ‘Our relationship is fairly OK with the 
youths as we have created the space for them to freely 
relate with us and even share security issues they 
identify’.27 The Local Policing Partnership boards 
(LPPbs) are part of the security apparatus and have 
gone a stage further to adopt the Informal resolution 
and restorative Justice Policy (IrrJ). This gives the 
community the opportunity to be part of the 
resolution of minor crimes and helps to create a more 
peaceful environment and trust amongst community 
people. The same type of collaboration was also 
developed in Kenema. The collaboration between the 
commanders and some of these youth groups ensure 
that security issues are contained, while new 
development programmes help to provide further 
livelihood opportunities for these groups. To what 
extent these micro-level initiatives will be sufficient to 
achieve this objective remains unclear.
4.2.4 What will happen after the departure 
of the international community?
The Agenda for Change and the Joint vision set very 
ambitious goals but many stakeholders worry that 
development–security initiatives are just about negative 
peace, basically a return to stability and the pre-war 
political settlement. The war in Sierra Leone was 
fought in the name of fighting injustices (against 
marginalisation, corruption, bad governance and 
human rights abuses) (richards 1996) and in this light a 
return to pre-war conditions is inadequate. A former 
member of the National Commission for resettlement, 
reintegration and reconstruction commented that 
the end of the war presented an opportunity for a 
transformative development agenda rather than a 
‘restorative’ one. However, ‘nation builders’ opted for 
a restorative mode based on sympathy rather than a 
right to development.28 
The main criteria for gauging the success of Sierra 
Leone’s internationally backed peacebuilding mission is 
based on the improving security situation in the country 
overall as well as the successful holding of presidential 
and legislative elections. The peace accord, which 
involved the two major political parties (All People’s 
Congress – APC, and Sierra Leone People’s Party – 
SLPP) and the Paramount Chiefs, who are the District 
Chiefs in Sierra Leone and nonpartisan members of 
Parliament, enabled a return to stability. However, both 
the 2007 and 2012 elections mark a clear continuity in 
the political use of violence that existed in the pre-war 
years. Old-guard politicians, with the support of ex-
combatants, still dominate the country’s electoral 
politics, what many young people call ‘poli-tricks’ and 
‘demo-crazy’, leading to the question of whether there 
has been any real transformation in Sierra Leone’s 
governance and political structures (Christensen and 
Utas 2008).
It is widely assumed that security–development 
integration was a success due to the nature of the UN 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding approaches and its 
integrated Joint vision. However, while exploring the 
impact of some specific programmes of the UN Joint 
vision, the limited influence and capacity of these at 
the ground level became clear. Development and 
security integration was happening, and relatively 
successful, but not as a direct effect of these 
programmes. The ex-combatants and youth more 
generally, who have been excluded from the 
internationally led peace accord and have been viewed 
as a risk group by the government and the international 
community, have managed to create their own 
livelihood strategies while playing an important role in 
the maintenance of order at the local level. As it 
currently stands, Sierra Leone has managed to contain 
violence. The question remains whether the local 
governance and associational life arrangements 
described above will be strong enough after the 
departure of the UN mission to sustain a political order 
that is legitimate and peaceful.
One could raise two doubts in this respect. The first 
one is that the successful transition to democracy has 
reinstated rather than replaced the key actors and 
players in the political game. It is therefore unclear how 
these actors will react and behave after the retreat of 
the international community. UNIPSIL’s exit strategy is 
related to the successful outcome of the elections. This 
is significant as the UN has been there for more than 
15 years. The peace accord was strongly internationally 
driven and it is unclear how the two key political parties 
will behave after the departure of the UN mission. The 
second one relates to the conception of the 
internationally driven security–development nexus. It 
has been concentrated in a narrow and linear way on 
stability and focusing on key ex-combatants, ignoring 
the wider security and development concerns of the 
youth. While an alternative form of development–
security integration is taking place on the ground, it is 
unclear how this local hybrid order will be able to 
recreate legitimate and popular institutions given its 
disconnect with internationally driven initiatives.
5 toward a new deal
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The spaces for development in fragile and conflict-
affected areas are qualitatively different from contexts 
that are peaceful and stable. The question is not 
whether development and security should be linked 
but rather how, with what consequences and for 
whose benefit. Linking development with security 
need not be about pursuing the security interests of 
donor countries. In Kenya, linking development with 
security is regarded as necessary to address political 
violence that is inflected with ethnic, regional and 
generational differences, and which closely intermingles 
with criminal violence and the drug trade. Efforts to 
combine development with security in Kenya’s Coast 
Province have prioritised local security needs such as 
conflict resolution and promoting accountability in 
politics and policing. Development and security are 
closely integrated in informal governance and 
associational life in Sierra Leone, as well, irrespective 
of official international strategy in the country to 
promote an integrated peacebuilding approach. In 
both countries, while there have been some local 
successes in improving development–security 
integration, their fate remains tied to wider political 
dynamics.
A different approach is required to integrate 
development and security, one that moves beyond the 
polarising views of stabilisation and statebuilding and 
prioritises the ways that international actors can work 
more effectively with local 
actors and processes. The 
New Deal priorities endorsed 
by the g7+ grouping of the 
world’s most fragile states 
as well as civil society and 
aid actors provide a focus 
for rethinking external aid 
approaches in fragile and 
conflict-affected contexts. 
The New Deal notes, ‘The 
current ways of working in 
fragile states need serious 
improvement... results and 
value for money have been 
modest’. Predominant ways 
of integrating development 
and security have had limited 
outcomes in many contexts. 
The need is clear for a new approach to integrate 
development and security in conflict-affected 
environments. As Zakaria argues, ‘We need to come to 
terms with Afghanistan’s realities rather than attempting 
to impose our fantasies on it. That means recognising 
that the Afghan government will not magically become 
effective and legitimate’ (Zakaria 2012). Development–
security integration has not worked in many contexts 
because of international actors’ limited influence and 
knowledge of the complexities of local political and 
security contexts. The inherent complexity and uncertainty 
that characterises these environments makes it difficult 
for international actors to operate safely or to guarantee 
the safety of local actors whose involvement is sought 
in combined development–security work. furthermore, 
since many initiatives to link development with security 
are by necessity quite localised, they have not always 
addressed wider dynamics that cause insecurity. Indeed, 
how to replicate successful local experience while also 
safeguarding local arrangements from meddling by wider 
influences is a key conundrum.
Local peacebuilding is an important challenge for 
international actors as it requires specific local 
knowledge, flexibility, and long-term sustained 
commitment. As faria (2011: 12) notes, ‘International 
actors must base their priorities on an understanding 
of the interaction and mediating processes between 
state and society at their various levels, as well as 
between social groups’. There is no prescribed set of 
measures, policies or practices to guarantee that 
development–security responses result in more 
peaceful outcomes. The OECD fragile States Principles 
emphasise the need to take local context as the starting 
point and align with local priorities. Understanding 
local culture and context, being adaptive, and 
empowering local counterparts are emphasised in 
the UK Stabilisation Unit guidance on how to 
deliver stabilisation activities (Stabilisation Unit 2010). 
Political and conflict analysis, as well as the use of a 
‘bottom-up’ approach that engages with non-state 
and community-level institutions, are core elements 
of an integrated approach to statebuilding and 
peacebuilding outlined in the DfID Building Peaceful 
States and Societies practice paper. 
This suggests that a ‘new deal’ is required, one that 
provides an alternative vision of development–security 
integration grounded in local security needs and 
priorities, diverse and conflictual as these often are in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings. In Kenya’s Coast 
Province, linking development with security is necessary 
to address violence affecting the poor that is enmeshed 
in ethnicised political divisions, widening socioeconomic 
inequalities and uncertainties engendered by political 
devolution. In Sierra Leone, the failure of internationally 
supported peacebuilding to engage with the needs of 
youth more widely – and not just those of ex-
combatants – threatens to give rise to new violence. 
A ‘new deal’ will put the security and safety of citizens 
first and find ways to deal with situations in which 
diverse and competing claims to power and various 
spheres of authority co-exist, overlap and intertwine. 
for development–security integration to be effective, 
it must create a new social contract between the 
individuals and the community and then between the 
community and the state before attempting to address 
broader state–society relations (Leonard 2013). 
The key operational question is to what extent 
international actors have sufficient expertise and 
contextual knowledge to carry out effective conflict 
resolution and peacebuilding work at the local level. A 
bottom-up approach is necessary but fraught with 
risks, not least because of intricate power dynamics at 
the local level, which are often hard for outside 
observers to see and understand. The international 
community all too often finds itself entangled in local 
agendas over which it has limited control and which 
can have perverse outcomes. Local actors, be they 
politicians, the military and police, local armed groups 
or chiefs, can be extremely resourceful in 
diverting external assistance to support their 
own local (and not necessarily 
peaceful or developmental) 
agendas. There is a real risk of 
failure. moreover, within aid 
cultures, there is a fundamental 
resistance to taking risks and 
failing (bellagio Initiative 
2012). This risk aversion in part 
has intensified owing to anti-
terrorism legislation and 
associated regulations since 
the September 11th attacks 
that prohibit material support 
to ‘terrorist’ organisations 
and extremists (Howell and 
Lind 2009). yet the very 
aversion to risk that permeates 
development aid is an 
important reason why so many development–security 
interventions have failed or have had only limited 
outcomes. As a Kenyan analyst noted, ‘One of the 
biggest weaknesses [of development–security work] 
is that we fail to see that failure is necessary for 
development’.29 
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5.1 Working with the grain
Taking risks is precisely what development actors need 
to do in order to uncover new approaches and ways 
of working that will have an impact. below we propose 
two concepts – brokerage and entrustment – that 
could be used to help anchor a ‘new deal’ encompassing 
different approaches and better ways of working in 
fragile and conflict-affected settings. The crux of these 
is to find ways of working with the grain in situations 
of mediated political authority.
5.1.1 Brokerage
brokerage involves actions to build a shared 
understanding amongst actors whose interests may 
vary significantly and whose capacities to act in support 
of these interests may be unequal. brokerage has been 
used to highlight the agency of social actors in ‘building 
social, political and economic 
roles rather than simply following 
normative scripts’ and to describe 
a ‘new ethnography of the social 
spaces that exist between aid 
funders and recipients’ (mosse 
and Lewis 2006: 11). A related 
term – brokers – usually refers to 
intermediaries existing between aid organisations and 
communities who ‘specialise in the acquisition, control 
and redistribution of development “revenue”’ (ibid.: 12). 
‘broker’ is a concept that is also important in literature 
on social capital, in which it is used to describe actors 
who are uniquely positioned to ‘bridge’ different sets 
of actors and interests. In social capital studies 
‘brokerage is about coordinating people between 
whom it would be valuable, but risky, to trust’ (burt 
2005: 164).
brokerage is instructive for how to shape 
development–security responses in situations that are 
characterised by fragmented authority and where 
power is mediated through local processes to reconcile 
the interests of different actors. rather than 
predetermining security outcomes and the governance 
arrangements that sustain these, development–security 
initiatives are likely to be more effective where they 
seek to support locally brokered agreements as well as 
spaces for such agreements to be continually reassessed 
and negotiated. Aid funders by definition cannot act as 
brokers in most fragile and conflict-affected settings 
because of their political ties and associations with 
discrete interests. yet as a concept it is helpful for 
directing attention to what entrusted partners in these 
settings can achieve. facilitating negotiations, trust-
building and supporting conditions for dialogue to 
continue are all roles that local development partners 
can fulfil, provided the right external support. These 
also contribute to strengthening governance and local 
agreements that improve security and safety.
brokerage as a practical concept has two broad 
meanings. firstly, it has been thought of as a tool for 
donors to deal with complex situations where their 
influence is limited. Another use of the term, by West 
African anthropologists, is how local agents can act as 
brokers between outside aid actors and locals. In 
Sierra Leone, Local Unit Commanders have linked 
international actors and youth, whose active 
participation is critical for successful peacebuilding but 
who are also difficult to reach. In Kenya, the approach 
taken by DANIDA is to fund trusted local partners who 
in turn provide platforms for dialogue and action on 
locally identified security concerns.
5.1.2 entrustment
Within development, entrustment is the principle of 
shifting real powers and capacities for action to levels of 
decision-making and organisational ability that are much 
nearer to populations and groups that are the stated 
focus of intervention. Entrustment encapsulates ideas of 
participation as well as subsidiarity. It embraces the idea 
that better development outcomes are likely to arise 
from more inclusive processes where there is a transfer 
of not only finances and responsibilities to ‘lower’ levels 
but also trust in locally developed analysis and 
understanding of development challenges and solutions.
Although the idea of entrustment is commonly used 
within development and aid work – usually in the sense 
of sharing resources and responsibilities with a partner 
who delivers development – there is little scholarly 
work on entrustment as a concept to steer aid practice. 
ribot writes about entrustment in the context of 
accommodating multiple interests in decentralised 
approaches to natural resources management and 
specifically as a way to empower local government and 
build up its capacities. ribot (2001: 334) uses the term 
in the sense of ‘transferring powers to’ and as a way 
to conceptualise the relationship of local government 
to both central government as well as populations they 
serve: ‘entrustment with powers is a key element in 
creating productive local governance’ (ibid.). While 
there remains a danger of lapsing into a top-down view 
in which international actors ‘entrust’ local people, 
entrustment is conceived as an alternative to externally 
orchestrated ‘participation’. 
Entrustment moves beyond glib assertions of the 
need to ‘empower’ local actors, as it proposes to 
transfer to local actors the powers not only to make 
decisions but also to define and assess problems as well 
as the resources to act on these. Operationally, 
entrustment can radically shift the practical focus of aid 
inputs. This was the case in the Peace, Security and 
Development Project supported by DANIDA, 
Denmark’s development cooperation agency, in the 
Coast Province of Kenya. Entrusting local partners to 
define the scope of PSD entailed recalibrating the project 
away from an anti-terrorism purpose and instead to 
focus on interventions that addressed interrelated 
threats to people’s everyday safety and security. 
 ENTrUSTmENT 
CAN rADICALLy SHIfT 
THE PrACTICAL fOCUS 
Of AID INPUTS. 
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Aid agencies have not overreached in linking 
development and security. Development in fragile and 
conflict-affected areas is very different from 
development in stable and peaceful areas – the same 
goes for security. Aid stakeholders have tinkered at the 
edges when what is needed is a wholesale reinvention 
of development in these contexts. With increasing 
volumes of aid directed to fragile and conflict-affected 
states, the issue is not whether development and 
security should be linked but rather in what ways, for 
whose interests, and with what consequences? 
Power is fragmented in fragile and conflict-affected 
areas, which makes it much more difficult for outsiders 
to operate. The knowledge, capacity and power of 
traditional OECD donors to influence long-lasting 
change in these places are limited. Donors should be 
far more explicit about when they cannot and should 
not intervene, as well as about 
when and how they should. 
Understanding the politics of 
complex situations of conflict 
and violence where ‘traditional’ 
development actors and donors 
may have little influence is a 
precondition for crafting 
effective aid interventions in 
these settings. So too is a 
broader political approach that 
moves beyond the usual suspects 
– government representatives, 
ministry officials, and traditional donors and Western 
NgOs. 
The task of formulating a ‘new deal’ is to find ways 
to work effectively with limited influence while also 
responding to meanings of security that are locally 
defined. Outside actors need to invest more in 
understanding local realities, politics and power. 
Entrustment and brokerage can be used to shape 
development–security responses. Entrustment means 
shifting power and capacity to lower levels and 
brokerage means supporting locally brokered 
agreements. rather than predetermine security 
outcomes and the governance arrangements that 
sustain these, development–security initiatives are 
likely to be more effective where they seek to support 
locally brokered agreements as well as spaces for such 
agreements to be continually reassessed and negotiated.
Working with the grain of local governance and 
politics requires redirecting resources to local partners. 
However, there is a disconnect: aid agencies need to 
work very differently in fragile and conflict-affected 
environments but find it increasingly difficult to do so. 
Cuts in donor bureaucracies over many years have 
reduced the number of key personnel and associated 
overheads that are required to provide strong oversight 
to aid spend. This need is even more important in fragile 
and conflict-affected states. Coupled with increasing 
aid volumes being channelled through bilateral aid 
agencies, capacity constraints have pushed many 
donors away from cultivating direct ties to individual 
organisations and instead work through ‘framework 
agreements’ and ‘consortium’ arrangements whereby 
a third party organisation manages grant administration 
and is the main contact for national and local partners 
alike. This shift additionally means that financial 
administrative capacities to manage small grants are 
also often missing in larger donor bureaucracies.
6.1 overcoming challenges
Any new deal is about new ways of doing development 
and security, ways that will increasingly become 
mainstreamed as development aid focuses more and 
more on fragile and conflict-affected areas. There are 
four key changes that aid agencies need to make. First, 
they need to commit more staff to the field in recognition 
of the localised nature of the issues. While there is a 
case for increasing the size of aid bureaucracies to more 
effectively manage funds directed to trusted local 
partners, moving aid personnel out of capital cities to 
regional centres will help aid organisations to learn 
more about the contexts in which they seek to 
intervene. One possible model is the ‘American 
Presence Posts’, which are very small US diplomatic 
facilities usually staffed by a single foreign service officer 
in outlying major cities and regions. While these are 
used for diplomatic and commercial purposes, there is 
a clear advantage to establishing similar decentralised 
posts for the purposes of improving the delivery of 
official development aid.
Second, aid agencies need to recruit staff with 
complementary skills in security, diplomacy, brokering 
and negotiation. Different types of staff than currently 
exist in aid bureaucracies are needed. Proficiency in 
accessing and interpreting information in complex 
environments as well as the skills to continuously 
manage the relationships that provide such knowledge 
are required. This is especially important when trusted 
local partners assume a far greater responsibility in 
analysing a problem and shaping and implementing an 
approach to address this.
Third, aid agencies must be prepared to take more 
calculated risks, finding ways of pooling risk with other 
actors to minimise political fallout at home but not 
in ways that weaken accountability to aid-recipient 
populations. Operationalising entrustment and 
brokerage will require that traditional OECD 
development actors reassess the trade-off between 
ensuring outcomes and taking risks. Implicit in both 
concepts is risk, and the need for specific local 
knowledge, flexibility and long-term sustained 
commitment. many efforts to combine development 
with security have disappointing results because of an 
institutionalised aversion to risk and to failing. There 
are many reasons why actors cut from a more 
traditional ‘development’ cloth are unable to take 
more risks. These include the need to ensure the safety 
and security of development personnel, local partners 
and the communities in which they work. Another 
factor is continuing insecurity and the presence of 
conflict spoilers, which in practice mean international 
actors seek to ‘do no harm’. A further limitation is the 
onerous reporting and auditing requirements of aid 
bureaucracies that necessitate due diligence and 
tracing the use of funds to their recipients. many 
requirements arise from wider legislation concerning 
counter-terrorism and thwarting money laundering 
and criminal activity. While the need for many 
requirements is understandable, in practice they are 
burdensome by restricting the space for aid recipients 
to form informal partnerships and respond quickly to 
changing circumstances on the ground. They also skew 
accountability relations upward to funding agencies 
and their respective governments rather than to 
communities. Within development more broadly, 
there is a wealth of knowledge and experience on 
monitoring and assessment that could be used to 
ensure that local partners are downwardly accountable 
and resilient to political pressure.
Fourth, aid agencies should resist rotating staff. The lack 
of intimate knowledge of fragile and conflict-affected 
places is a major impediment to reinventing 
development in ways that promote the security of the 
poor. Inadvertently, donors have contributed to the 
problem by moving to establish in-house professional 
cadres, with technical advisers rotating every few years. 
What is often required alongside technical expertise is 
a more rounded knowledge and understanding of the 
polities, societies and histories of particular places.
6.2 risking to succeed
Current dialogue around the post-2015 development 
agenda provides an opening to strike a ‘new deal’. 
fragile states are those furthest away from achieving 
the millennium Development goals. Efforts by 
the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and 
Statebuilding to push its New Deal priorities highlight 
the need to address issues of conflict, violence and 
insecurity in ongoing consultations informing the post-
2015 agenda and related international architecture. The 
UN High Level Panel on the future of development, 
under the stewardship of co-chair David Cameron, 
should draw from the New Deal recommendations as 
well as the growing body of policy evidence from fragile 
and conflict-affected contexts on how to strengthen 
local security arrangements. 
renewing commitments to local partnerships and 
redirecting resources to increase these will strengthen 
combined development–security work in rapidly changing 
fragile and conflict-affected contexts. much development–
security work is necessarily localised and initiatives that 
respond to locally defined security concerns are more 
likely to succeed. yet there are limits of knowledge, 
capacity and influence 
to act effectively at the 
micro level. many 
development–security 
efforts acknowledge 
the need for local 
par t i c ipat ion  or 
ownership. greater 
insight and guidance is 
required on how to 
create constructive local 
partnerships as well as 
to minimise bureaucratic 
impediments that make 
it difficult to nurture a 
real sense of ownership amongst local security 
stakeholders. renewing commitment to local partnerships 
entails taking risks, and sometimes these will fail. 
recognising and accepting this is an important step 
toward realising a ‘new deal’.
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